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Abstract 
This article challenges various theories of the capitalist epoch as a process of civilization to 
posit a new theoretical framework built around the concept of pseudo-pacification. Principal 
indicators of civilizing momentum, such as the decline in homicide and brutal punishment, 
are relocated in a perspective that juxtaposes them with the concomitant proliferation of non-
violent crimes and the types of aggressive sociosymbolic competition that energise and 
structure consumer culture. What seems to have occurred is not the repression or dissipation 
of aggressive libidinal energy but its conversion into a dynamic yet largely pacified form that 
performs the dual function of protecting property and expanding production and trade by 
intensifying and democratising sociosymbolic competition.  The pseudo-pacification process 
does not counteract but stimulates and reproduces aggressive drives in sublimated forms to 
create a fragile social peace whose potential disintegrative forces are manufactured at the 
very core of its own socioeconomic and cultural systems. 
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Introduction 
Statistical evidence supports the Whiggish claim that from its nascence in the Late Middle 
Ages in Europe the Western liberal-capitalist era has been characterised by a decline in rates 
of homicide and serious violence in the public sphere (Eisner, 2001). This decline seems to 
have occurred alongside progress in economic productivity and individual rights. However, it 
was also accompanied by a notable if rather undulating rise in the rate of acquisitive property 
crime (Sharpe, 1996), committed increasingly for the purpose of obtaining and displaying 
symbols of conspicuous consumption (Hallsworth, 2005; Hall et al., 2008). This suggests not 
a diminution but a conversion of aggressive libidinal energy into a more pacified yet more 
expansive form. Thus we must consider the possibility that the liberal-capitalist epoch has not 
been characterised by a civilizing process but a pseudo-pacification process. This process 
seems to have evolved to perform the complementary tasks of sublimating libidinal energy 
into a form that fuels aggressive competition in the sociosymbolic field, whilst 
simultaneously reducing the physical violence that hampers the protection and trading of 
property. Therefore the pseudo-pacification process supplied the liberal-capitalist project with 
the invaluable combination of psychosocial momentum alongside a pacified environment 
conducive to the project of economic expansion. In essence, the primary purpose behind 
reducing and sublimating physical violence was not to establish a peaceful, sociable existence 
for human beings but to maintain a safer environment for the intensification and democratic 
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expansion of aggressive yet rule-bound sociosymbolic competition. This chapter charts the 
process from its beginnings in early modernity and analyses its psychosocial dynamics. At its 
core, the process is reliant on the stimulation and pacified acting-out of obscene drives and 
object-related desires, whose generative bases are in anxiety, torment and dissociation. 
Acting out these drives and desires once would have attracted the label ‘evil’. The aim of this 
chapter is not to reduce explanations of diverse manifestations of human violence to the 
singular effect of pseudo-pacification, but to reveal this process as a pervasive and fragile 
cultural current in which eruptions of various forms of violence are likely to occur as long as 
it continues to be a mainstay of cultural and socioeconomic life. 
 
 
Pseudo-pacification as a historical process 
In England, the homicide rate entered a long period of decline from the late 14th century. 
From the mid-16th century, mainland Western Europe also experienced a similar decline. 
Although unknown rates of violence remained hidden in the family, the workplace and other 
private spaces, and there were many undulations and complexities, the general long-term 
historical trend in the world’s first market-capitalist societies seems to have been a decline in 
homicide and life-threatening physical violence in the public sphere (Eisner, 2001).This 
seems to lend empirical weight to Elias’s (1994) claim that the continent underwent a 
‘civilizing process’. According to Elias, the process’s three mainstays are the state’s 
monopolization of physical violence, the diffusion of behavioural codes throughout the social 
body, and the expansion of ‘figurational’ social interdependencies that drew individuals 
together in relations of mutual benefit and respect. The vital cultural product of this triptych 
of civilizing forces was the inculcation and reproduction of embodied sensibilities in the 
majority of individuals, who, as the subjects of new processes of sociogenesis and 
psychogenesis, began to react with repugnance to the gruesome consequences of physical 
violence and cruel punishments.  
 
However, Elias’s theory glosses over important aspects of the general field of crime, harm 
and violence. Apart from numerous problems associated with the relationship between 
culture and nature, and the lack of a clear explanation of the relation between sociogenesis 
and psychogenesis, it understates the continuation of brutality in the punishment system and 
the reproduction of exploitative social relations in the economic system. Elias understood that 
the ‘civilizing process’ was not an attempt to eliminate violence from human life, but to 
relocate and store it ‘behind the scenes’ to unleash in practices of punishment (Garland, 
1990) or military violence (Fletcher, 1997).  However, because he overstates the functional 
efficacy, neutrality and legitimacy of the state he therefore understates the violent social 
conflict frequently precipitated by the ineffectiveness and politicisation of the control 
apparatus.  The thesis’s explanatory framework also fails to incorporate the fragile pacifying 
effect of the institutionalisation of social conflict, as organised labour developed practices of 
negotiation with capital in the industrial capitalist era from the late 19th century (Wieviorka, 
2009). This established temporary and partial solidarity amongst the working classes and 
pacified what had frequently been violent social conflict over inequality, oppression and 
various single issues such as religious rights and food prices. Elias’s rather simplified 
tripartite structure of civilizing forces also fails to incorporate the developing bureaucratic 
organisation of welfare and education systems (Mucchielli, 2010), and his rather transcendent 
conceptualisation of ‘social’ interdependencies ignores the incorporation of subjects and their 
fears, passions and associations into productive work; direct participation in stable forms of 
organised labour itself, not just the social figurations it underpins, has a vital civilizing effect 
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based on the daily affirmation of the knowledge that the individual cannot survive alone 
(Dejours, 2003).  
 
Constant eruptions of state violence, organised criminal violence, political violence and 
privatised violence in the domestic sphere and the workplace throughout the liberal-capitalist 
epoch, and the recent riots and the rise of violent crime in the West since the 1980s, all 
suggest that the so-called civilizing process is in its form and function actually a rather fragile 
and unstable pacification process, whose tripartite structure is unable to reproduce itself in a 
coherent and stable form, and whose ability to inculcate durable civilized emotions in 
subjects must be questioned. This inherent instability suggests that the process is ultimately 
dependent on the maintenance of a stable and supportive politico-economic environment and 
the constant gratification of social ambitions and private fantasy-desires inculcated in 
subjects by mass-mediated consumer culture (Hall et al., 2008). The tendency for individual 
and group violence incessantly to burst through the restraints supposedly provided by Elias’s 
cultivated sensibilities suggests that violence was not simply concealed and ‘stored up’ 
behind physical and metaphorical walls, but that it was also ‘stored up’ behind the 
sensibilities and cultural codes that restrained its physical form and converted it to an 
aggressive yet pacified sociosymbolic form that displayed a tendency to revert to physicality 
in specific circumstances.  
 
However, Wieviorka (2009) warns us that we cannot understand violent subjectivities as a 
singular undifferentiated category produced by a process of social evolution. He provides us 
with a typology: hypersubjectivity, the product of an overload or a plethora of meanings; 
desubjectivated non-subjectivity capable of surrender to the banality of evil; socially liberated 
antisubjectivity orientated to cruelty, sadism and violence as an end in itself; and subjectivity 
aimed at conserving its being or its foundation. He also reminds us that these subjectivities 
are the products of heterogeneous circumstances and experiences at the micro-level. 
However, we do not have to disagree with this pluralistic analysis and descend to crude forms 
of reductionism and essentialism to acknowledge the copious evidence of both long-term and 
short-term spatial and historical patterns of serious violence, ranging from homicide and 
serial killing to riots, which are quite easy to identify (Dorling, 2004; Wilson, 2007; Parker, 
2008). The long-term decline in the homicide rate in Europe over the course of modernity 
holds true (Eisner, 2001), and a number of decades characterised by disruptive 
socioeconomic change – for instance neoliberal Britain and the USA in the 1980s – have 
suffered from abrupt rises in rates of most forms of crime and public violence (Reiner, 2007; 
Hall and McLean, 2009; Marktanner and Noiset, 2013). In other words, we can identify long-
term periods, short-term periods and specific social spaces in which there is some degree of 
synchronisation in both the generative constitution and acting out of Wieviorka’s 
differentiated categories of violent subjectivity. The following argument will show how 
tendencies towards these various forms of subjectivity and modes of acting them out are 
rooted in a long-term process of cultural change that cannot be described as a ‘civilizing 
process’, and why these differentiated forms are interrelated variants with a common root in 
generative conditions associated with an underlying historical process. 
 
Mucchielli (2010) reminds us that Elias’s thesis also ignores the destructive effects of socio-
spatial segregation and consumer culture’s anti-social psychological stimulations and 
distractions. The ubiquity and durability of these socially disintegrative conditions and 
tendencies suggest that they are not simply the products of latent regressive forces released 
from some unknown source by temporal lapses in the maintenance of Elias’s triangular 
framework. Mucchielli argues that the social effects of disintegrative forces – poverty, 
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segregation, lack of opportunity – produce corresponding psychological effects: stress, 
depression, frustration, resentment, anger and so on. However, as prescient as it is, this 
analysis offers no answer to the question of why psychological life in these adverse 
conditions manifests itself in bouts of competitive consumption and violence rather than 
articulate political protest or rebellion. Why resort to acting out the ideologically disavowed 
‘dark heart’ of the system – violence, looting, exploitation, infantile hedonism – rather than 
seeking solidarity and articulate politics in the face of adversity? Throughout the industrial 
era of institutionalised conflict the European working class consistently demonstrated the 
drive to seek and occasionally find solidarity and unifying politics in three primary forms – 
communism, socialism and reformist social democracy – despite these conditions (Winlow 
and Hall, 2013).  
 
We can agree with Mucchielli’s critique of Elias’s thesis and his useful additions to the 
explanatory framework, and with Wieviorka’s (2009) appeal to abandon Elias’s evolutionary 
approach because it simply cannot explain the conflict, heterogeneous forms of violence and 
violent subjectivity we have witnessed throughout the 20th century. However, both Mucchielli 
and Wieviorka have trouble explaining why the post-war social democratic system of 
institutionalised and politicised conflict fell apart so easily in the 1980s (see Dean, 2009) to 
be displaced by sporadic eruptions of violent pre-political crime and rioting (Bauman, 2012; 
Stiegler, 2013; Treadwell, et al 2013). Although we must acknowledge and attempt to 
incorporate Wieviorka’s formal plurality, the existence of identifiable patterns of violence 
suggests that our understanding is best advanced by continuing to conceptualise the types we 
are seeing in Europe today as the products of some sort of underlying process.  
 
Before we investigate this process we must begin with a de-romanticising correction. The 
popular revisionist notion of ethnic groups peacefully accommodating each other in the 
intervallic Dark Age between the fall of the Roman Empire and the Late Middle Ages has 
been challenged by Ward-Perkins’s (2005) revealing study. The decline of material 
production, culture and ethnic relations to prehistoric levels – the latter resulting in the death 
of huge proportions of European populations by blows to the head and vital organs – suggests 
that this period was every bit as violent as traditional historians once thought it was (see 
Žižek, 2010). It looks like the ‘grand narrative’ that from the Late Middle Ages Europe 
experienced as broad shift away from a notably violent period in its history – characterised by 
the acquisition and defence of land, treasure and bodily honour – towards the less violent 
acquisition of more diverse sociosymbolic resources has some purchase on reality (Hall, 
2012a). The signs also point to the probability that although regions in Southern Europe 
began to develop market economies earlier, this mutative process first took hold more firmly 
in England on the back of unique legal and sociocultural changes (see Macfarlane, 1978), 
which we will now investigate in further detail.  
 
After the Norman invasion disrupted the island’s socio-political fabric, violent gangs took 
advantage of the Norman warlords’ lax administration (Hibbert, 2003). By the Late Middle 
Ages, violence structured and reproduced a rigid class-based social order whose weak 
legitimacy and institutional framework were shored up by internal aggression (Maddern, 
1992). In such a hostile and lawless environment the population felt safer entrenched in 
defensive familial and communal units. However, this lax administration also created a 
broader deregulated space in which wealthier peasants and merchants could accelerate the 
commercial development of land and urban markets. These newcomers into the economic 
fold realised that both authorised structural violence and unauthorised criminal violence were 
hampering the growth of markets (Hall, 2012a). This proto-bourgeoisie, initially attempting 
5 
 
 
to ascend the social order by convincing monarchs that they could increase the wealth of the 
nation, sought a middle-way. It quickly became apparent that if property is to be safely and 
efficiently traded it must be protected by the rule of law, and yet, paradoxically, the 
expansion of this trade can be accelerated in unregulated spaces beneath the law, wealth 
creation can be more efficiently developed in a ‘third space’ created by the tension between 
order and disorder. Hence, in order to create this third space, the new and ambitious social 
group sought pacified variants of order and disorder to operate in a more stable form of 
dynamic tension. To protect property and allow trade the embryonic market-capitalist system 
required the rule of law to evacuate previously normalised physical violence from nascent 
commercial nodes and arteries (market towns, roads etc.). Simultaneously, the law had to 
sever its relation to existing customs of fair trading, yet deter violent retribution when moral 
judgements were cast onto the more dubious emerging practices – especially when they went 
awry – such as usury, cheating on weights and measures, bad debts or undercutting prices 
(ibid.). Physical violence was to be displaced by pacified yet aggressive, competitive and 
exploitative practices, which were destructive to existing customs but which could be freely 
encouraged and acted out as they were protected by law. The overall shift was dependent on 
the dual pacification of the forces of social order and disorder. 
 
Firstly, a concerted attempt was made to gradually and partially pacify violent modes of 
maintaining social order. In the twelfth to thirteenth centuries, under the misgovernment of 
Henry III, order could not be imposed as violent gangs monopolised trading nodes and 
arteries, including valuable ports and market towns, and controlled the trade in precious 
metals (Hibbert, 2003). The ruling aristocracy’s violent control methods often proved 
ineffective, escalating conflict as they faced these heavily-armed gangs. This palpable failure 
reduced public confidence in the ability of government to deal with privatised violence and 
protect property. Edward I, crowned in 1274, reorganised the militias and the whole criminal 
justice system in ways that involved the delegation of everyday citizens as agents in practices 
of crime control. This democratisation of control set in motion the gradual diminution of 
violence, to be displaced by diffused surveillance and ‘social pressure’ as the primary social 
structuring and regulatory force. This allowed more effective control of violent gangs, which 
created a space of reduced physical violence in which the early bourgeoisie could increase 
trade and the commercialisation of land in relative safety. In this environment the richer and 
more enterprising peasants and merchants could become more confident and active as they 
built the nascent market economy.  
 
Secondly, the violent forces of social disorder were not only more efficiently repressed but 
significantly reconstructed. The presence of physically violent gangs, whose practices 
maintained brutal forms of order only at the nodal micro-level, limited market-driven 
economic growth at the broader level. Methods were sought to simultaneously stimulate 
individualised desire for new commodities yet increase pacification in civil society. The 
introduction of the laws of primogeniture and entail throughout the social structure in 
England – which were applied solely to the ruling class across the rest of Europe – from the 
12th century made families less secure places for children. This was the first step in the 
gradual dissolution of the family, community and land as the principal sites of honour, 
protection, identification and solidarity (Macfarlane, 1978), creating sibling rivalry on a new 
enhanced scale and extending it from the internal affective-relational dimension to the 
external economic dimension. This major cultural shift also significantly increased siblings’ 
mistrust and potential hatred of parents, who from that point onwards had total arbitrary 
rights to property and its distribution amongst family members. The legally-driven splitting 
of the family, and with it the geographically-bound ethnic community, corresponds with the 
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splitting of the individual ego and the redirection of its identification processes, from the 
family and community outward to the world of the commercial market in which offspring 
were forced to engage in pacified economic competition against each other as their traditional 
mode of security and status was disrupted. The psychosocial process was analogous to 
biological cell-splitting and growth, creating a sort of socioeconomic tumour as anxious 
subjects were cast out into competitive markets to seek wealth and establish their own 
domains. The overall process weakened the family as the legitimate unit of ‘righteous 
violence’ (Hall, 2012a). It risked the continued formation of violent gangs as substitute 
families, but as the complementary pacification and individualisation processes were 
gradually normalised this risk was significantly reduced. 
 
This new insecure and competitive subjectivity become functional to the developing market 
economy, advantaging those who more fully embodied and practiced it; it was unprotected, 
vulnerable, anxious, ambitious and resentful of community and its multiple obligations. The 
process resembles Deleuze and Guattari’s (1984) de-territorialisation, but it was more 
dialectical in the sense that the desire to de-territorialise and re-territorialise in a constant, 
circular dynamic process of expansion and proliferation was, after the initial disintegrative 
legal force had been applied, internally driven and reproduced rather than imposed 
exclusively by some extraneous political force. The process intensified, systematised and 
harnessed to the developing market economy the relational-subjective contradictions and 
hostile relations that Jameson (2010) points out as the norm in family units in the ancient 
world, the origin of the social dialectic. In this more recent period, however, the subject was 
forced to seek new security, status and identity not in the ancient cycle of Odyssey and 
Anabasis – the outward journey to adventure and the difficult return home to receive 
accolades (see Badiou, 2007) – but in the rapidly developing commercial economy, with its 
proliferation of symbolic objects. Many parents attempted to compensate for their legally-
grounded role in this process and recover affection by doing everything they could to equip 
children to compete effectively in an increasingly pacified, rule-bound mode, the new 
measure of ‘successful parenting’ which persists today.  
 
Between the Norman invasion and the Industrial Revolution, England ceased to be a standard 
European peasant society; it became highly individualised, competitive and oriented to small 
business (Bloch, 1967; Macfarlane, 1978). The individualisation process spawned a huge 
literature concerned with the expression of private dreams, ideals and life-projects (Thomas, 
2009; Eagleton, 2009). The private pursuit of jouissance and the non-violent competition to 
monopolise trade displaced the traditional culturo-economic mode that had been maintained 
and reproduced by violence, redirecting libidinal energy to the pursuit of money and 
commercially distributed symbols of social distinction. The mode of acquiring material 
wealth and social status gradually shifted from ‘somewhere’, the violent defence of bodily 
honour and the monopolisation of trade, precious metals and land, to ‘everywhere and 
nowhere’, the pacified acquisition of the abstract values of money and social symbolism 
(Hall, 2012a).  
 
Individualist culture, beginning in England and gathering tributaries from elsewhere in 
Europe, spread across the developing capitalist world (Dumont, 1986). The vital psychosocial 
element was rooted in the Lacanian principle that absence creates desire; the loss of 
protective, reproductive community with its durable identity became the great objet petit a, 
the unnameable lost object (see Lacan, 2007; Žižek, 2006). The replacement – the 
competitive individual seeking personal wealth and security in the market – became the 
master signifier of the new fundamental fantasy, the dream in which amorphous libidinal 
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energy assumes its initial imaginary and symbolic shape to forge the individual’s basic 
identity. In both the fundamental fantasy and the economic practice of the competitive, 
acquisitive entrepreneur, successful performance in the market became the principal form of 
combined cultural and symbolic capital, and thus, in the absence of traditional brethren, the 
source of ego-ideal figures in the shape of the new masters of sublimated aggressive 
competition (Winlow and Hall, 2009). England, the first fully industrialised imperial 
capitalist nation, invented a disproportionate number of the world’s sports and games (see 
Holt, 1990) in order to encourage subjectivity – particularly male subjectivity in the shape of 
the ‘muscular Christian’ (see Whitehead, 2002) – to forge itself in an environment of rule-
bound aggression.  
 
It’s important to note that both poles of the human emotional spectrum were truncated for the 
purpose of domestication and socioeconomic utilisation. Violence was repressed and 
sublimated along with the impulse to concrete altruism. As the market-capitalist project 
developed and expanded its territorial scope from the 15th century, the eternally difficult 
ethico-social task of diffusing the ideals and protocols of the community outwards to the 
general society and economy was abandoned (Eagleton, 2009), and laws regulating usury, 
wages and prices were relaxed.  In many respects the opposite process prevailed as 
competitive market practices were introduced into communities and all social institutions; in 
the current neoliberal era we witness an attempt to totalise this process and bring economic 
history to a close. Concrete altruism was transposed into the diluted form of post hoc 
sentimentalism and benevolentism, which constituted Pocock’s (1989) ‘commercial 
humanism’. In a remarkable process of defeat and subjugation, capitalism confronted, 
sublimated, incorporated and put to work in a relation of dynamic tension its two main 
psychosocial threats, violence and altruism; it cannot reproduce itself in an environment 
dominated by either. Our culture exists in a fragile pseudo-pacified third space compressed 
and propelled beyond these two potent but repressed social forces and their volatile 
sublimatory relation; forward momentum is generated by the constant movement beyond the 
violence and altruism that always seek to return to their traditional places.  
 
The process that activated and controlled the stimulation and pacification of aggressive 
libidinal energy in England, and, later, Europe and North America, was quite unique. Many 
societies disarmed and pacified their populations – indeed some might have been more 
civilized in the true sense of the word – but none developed with so much success the specific 
amalgam of pacification and sublimation required to establish la doceur du commerce (see 
Hirschman, 1977) and simultaneously stimulate the libidinal energy that feeds the consumer-
driven market economy. The old rigid class relation had to be made more permeable and 
meritocratic – but only under the strict criterion of market performance – to boost individual 
ambition, energise markets and quell dissent and social conflict to a manageable level. The 
accepted route for educated and enterprising members of the lower classes was upwards 
through the loose and permeable class structure, which constantly releases the political 
pressure that can build up from below.  
 
 
The role of consumer culture in the pseudo-pacification process 
Social science still tends to underestimate the importance of consumer culture, as both a 
primary driver in early capitalist history and the dominant cultural form in the neoliberal era 
(Campbell, 1987; Smart, 2010). It developed as a potent dynamic force and pre-existed full 
industrialisation. In14th century Europe, when the population reduction caused by the Plague 
made the expansion of production and trade vital, consumer culture was propagated first 
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amongst the courtly and gentrified classes as a means of increasing demand. The ascent of 
these groups was the first step in the gradual shift to a more permeable social structure which 
eased social climbing by economic means. Consumer symbolism was certainly regarded as a 
serious social issue; in England, as the aristocracy were troubled by the rapidity of social 
change, Edward III enacted secular ‘sumptuary laws’ to prevent the potential reversal of the 
sociosymbolic violence that has always played an important part in the reproduction of elite 
rule (Sassatelli, 2008).  
 
The explosion of consumer culture rapidly expanded demand for luxury goods industries 
across Europe. By the 15th century, entrepreneurial peasants became wealthier as navigation 
and superior ships opened up new sea lanes and markets began to expand. Defying the 
sumptuary laws and often marrying into the aristocracy to enable their social ascent, the new 
gentrified class started dressing in ways that imitated or in some cases outshone an 
aristocracy that could already sense its own decline. As consumer culture permeated social 
life it provided actors with a crucial sociosymbolic infrastructure whose almost unlimited 
ability to change its cultural codes at an increasing velocity over time (see Appadurai, 1996) 
combined rule-bound pacification with ruthless forms of individualised socioeconomic 
struggle. The heightened anxiety in England caused by familial and communal disruption 
drove enterprising individuals to compete harder than their European counterparts. 
 
This dynamic movement seemed irrepressible; as the early capitalists moved into urban 
centres to expand trading activities and develop ‘sumptuary’ tastes, many began to by-pass 
legal restrictions on trade. They developed informal markets outside towns to avoid rents, 
tolls and taxes, and struck up relations with illegal traders to secure cheaper commodities and 
undercut prices. As many criminologists suggest, throughout this long period the distinction 
Max Weber (2002) made between good and bad business practice was in reality far more 
blurred (Hobbs, 1989). Protestant asceticism was a latecomer to a socioeconomic process 
already well established, acting largely as a restraint rather than a driver. Protestantism’s 
public distaste for excess masked the underlying and very active drives for luxury and 
decadence, which were acted out in private aristophiliac games (Hall et al., 2008). The often 
rather amusing hypocrisy that resulted from this tension between private desires and public 
correctness was the focus of some of the best bourgeois literature (Moretti, 2013). Neither 
can the Weberian view of capitalism as ‘ethically-driven’ account for Protestant asceticism as 
the ‘vanishing mediator’ in the capitalist project (Jameson, 2010). This, and the standard 
Marxist notion that it is simply ‘the system’ and its drive for profits that damages our lives, 
have both obstructed intellectual enquiry into the ways in which individuals ritually by-pass 
ethical injunctions to perform yet simultaneously disavow their vital roles in the system’s 
reproduction (Hall, 2012a).  
 
As the capitalist project developed, the pseudo-pacification process became more successful 
in its primary task of evacuating ethical and communal values from their position as core 
drivers and relocating them to a new position in the socioeconomic system to meld with 
norms and laws and function as a strategic device to guide both action and restraint (Hall et 
al., 2008; Moxon, 2011). Concerned members of the bourgeoisie developed a rather schizoid 
and fearful attitude to the socioeconomic change they were actively promoting and, indeed, 
often regarded as historically inevitable.  Henry Fielding, for instance, condemned moral 
decline and the drive for ‘luxury amongst the vulgar’ as he also paradoxically recognised 
competitive individualism and the controlled seeking of status symbols as essential for 
economic development (Hall, 2012a).  
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As the middle classes became wealthier they also became victims of a new form of 
‘objectless anxiety’ (Hall, 2012a; 2012b) as the socioeconomic system they promoted 
hollowed out social life and introduced novel, subtle and clandestine forms of ‘little evils’ as 
myriad drive-fuelled unethical practices in everyday life (Badiou, 2002). However, this 
anxiety – objectless because its foundation in social dissolution and the ethical and political 
problems it caused were ideologically disavowed and banished from everyday discourse – 
was also the system’s primary energy source. As we have seen, anxiety creates desire (Lacan, 
2007; see also Roudinesco, 2014), but this amorphous, multi-purpose objectless anxiety was 
reproduced by the constant denial of its own objective causal condition – hollowed-out 
ethical and social life and the unstable economy – to become the primary stimulant in 
capitalism’s productive and consumerised cultural life. It was highly effective because it 
could both create and utilise human drives to produce a new range of objective desires that 
constantly promise and fail to compensate for the constitutive lack that lies at the heart of 
subjectivity. The diversity of objective desires was limited only to the number of 
symbolically-laden commodities the production system could produce and circulate in 
markets. If we emphasise the distinction between drive and desire, here we can see clearly 
that the foundations of Wieviorka’s (2009) typology – the loss of meaning (as fragile 
solidarity is constantly dissolved), the liberation of substitute meanings (as drive-fuelled 
desires are stimulated), and the overload of substitute meanings (as drives are repressed and 
sublimated to proliferate desires) – are interconnected dynamic aspects of the pseudo-
pacification process. 
 
As industrialisation brought affordable luxuries to the majority, the developing consumer-
capitalist system continued to expand the compensatory comforts in the system of sign-
objects that mass-mediated consumer culture now presents as a surrogate social world (Hall 
et al., 2008). The individual is beckoned towards painful, socially destructive and 
unachievable jouissance, but also restricted to a domesticated mode of acting out ambition 
and frustration (see Stiegler, 2009) as it declares a victory each time a fragile, temporary 
position of sociosymbolic distinction is achieved by pacified means (Hall et al., ibid.). In 
Lacanian terms, the consumer-capitalist system retained its proximity to the obscene Real, 
stimulating envy and anxiety (Žižek, 2010) and reworking in a pseudo-pacified form the 
barbaric, wasteful and violently competitive drives for the pecuniary reward, status and 
honour that were political currency in the Dark Ages (Veblen, 1994). The obscene drives 
located in the Lacanian Real were not transcended but stimulated and subsequently 
sublimated in a complex culturo-legal system to be rule-bound and harnessed to the economy. 
In the neoliberal era we are experiencing the restoration and global diffusion of this process 
in a borderless, minimally-regulated and technologically-enhanced form. 
 
 
The pseudo-pacification process falters and recovers  
The libidinal energy generated by the unstable pseudo-pacification process is highly 
criminogenic, the principal force behind the expansion of property crime over the course of 
capitalist history. The criminogenic effect is restrained at its boundary by an expansive and 
intrusive public/private control system. We have little choice but to make a concession to the 
Right and admit that the ‘crime drop’ the West experienced in the 1990s after the ‘crime 
explosion’ in the 1980s is largely the product of advances in the control system – smart 
policing, expansive social programmes, increased surveillance, mass imprisonment, DNA 
testing, environmental securitisation and so on operating in a context shored up by huge 
welfare budgets. This explanation must be combined with additional criminological factors, 
which include the continuation of a large realm of unrecorded ‘crimes of the powerful’ and 
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the mutation of crime into new and only partially recorded forms such as cyber-crime, the 
reduction in the number of young adults in the population and the appearance of a remarkable 
lethargy amongst many young people (Hall, 2012a). Reflecting on his experience of teaching 
young people in Britain’s Further Education system, Fisher (2009: 23) notes their tendency to 
fall into ‘depressive hedonia’, the ‘soft narcosis, the comfort food oblivion of Playstation, all-
night TV and marijuana’. We now see culture and economy working in harmony in a post-
political world to constitute and reproduce the perfectly anxious yet docile consumer 
(Winlow and Hall, 2013). 
 
None of these factors signifies an improvement in social relations or a reduction in the 
subjective motivation to crime and the competitive individualism that pervades Western 
societies. Rather, the crime-drop signifies a retreat into subjectivity (Winlow and Hall, ibid.) 
and the successful adaptation of the pseudo-pacification process as it adjusts its mode of 
operation to new circumstances laid down by neoliberalism’s global economy. The dual 
system of pacification and control has been advanced as the techniques of stimulation were 
intensified to release more energy into a culturally-driven economy that offers significantly 
expanded opportunities for the gratification of jouissance via the acquisition of important 
symbolic objects and forms of entertainment in its advanced digital media systems. After a 
brief period of instability in the 1980s and 1990s as the neoliberal political and business elite 
decided to combat economic stagnation by performing the dangerous operation of 
downscaling social democracy’s old economic regulatory system at the same time as 
increasing consumer pressure on the individual, the pseudo-pacification process fought back 
to return to operational duties in its most advanced form. Put simply, the key to the reduction 
in crime and violence was the expansion and improved efficiency of both ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ 
dimensions of the control system at the same time as the significant expansion of 
opportunities for even the poorer service workers and welfare recipients to act out non-
violently the drives that were stimulated further by a culture dominated by competitive 
individualism and consumer hedonism. 
 
 
 
 
The psychosocial basis of evil 
A crucial factor currently hampering social science’s investigation into today’s harmful forms 
of crime and violence is that the main philosophical schools from which it draws offer no 
conception of evil as drive. Only the temporary departure from prevailing ethical standards, 
the lust for domination amongst powerful elites, or the social reaction to ‘otherness’ receive 
critical attention. To speak of evil is condemned as pathologisation, a vestige of obsolete 
theological paradigms (Wieviorka, 2012). However, Jameson (2010) and Todorov and Brown 
(2010) argue that the good/evil duality is universal in human ethical discourse, and remind us 
that it’s not really ‘evil’ as a concept that the liberal establishment worry about but the social 
structuring of the idea as it used to construct a pathologised ‘other’ on the social margins. 
Social science textbooks often begin with grim warnings that pathologisation was behind the 
evil regimes of the past – most importantly Nazism. Evil has been excised from the discourse 
because of the fear that it could be used to legitimise the politics of violent social reaction, 
which we all hope we can one day consign to the dustbin of history. Consequently, liberal 
thought in general has been able to replace the idea of evil as an eternal force against which 
we must constantly struggle with a highly diluted, temporal and individualised substitute; 
individuals simply ‘err’ as they fail to live up to cultural standards, often through no fault of 
their own. Thus liberalism acts as an avuncular patrician, like ‘a headmaster signing off the 
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end-of-year report’ (Dews, 2008: 11) on individuals who tried but perhaps, with 
understanding and guidance, could do a little better. 
 
This intellectual ban prevents us from even considering the possibility that some restrained 
and reworked form of ‘evil’ might exist at the very core of the socioeconomic system. The 
idea was certainly shared by some traditional Marxists and conservatives, such as Adorno and 
Eliot (see Shusterman, 1993), and it is regaining traction amongst their current equivalent 
pairings, such as Žižek and Sloterdijk (see Winlow and Hall, 2013), who agree on problems 
such as the evaporation of solidarity and public space in the heat generated by the individual 
competition for endless superficial novelties. Because it offends a central injunction, the idea 
proposed here – that the ‘evil’ of Dark Age violence was gradually sublimated, democratised 
and harnessed via sociosymbolic competition to drive the economy – risks outright rejection 
in the post-war liberal social-scientific establishment. However, in defence of the idea, it 
must be noted that very similar types of politico-cultural opportunism cropped up regularly in 
the discourses that accompanied most of the more economically successful civilizations. For 
instance, as the Chinese Legalists displaced Confucians they were quite open about their 
commitment to retain ‘evil’ and harness it to the expansion of empire with the aid of a 
bureaucratic state (Žižek, 2010). It was also common in political and economic circles across 
modern Europe; classical liberalism’s economic first principle was simply an adoption of the 
Mandevillean notion of stimulating specific ‘refined private vices’ orientated to a more 
pacified and efficient form of economic growth, the principal ‘public good’ that the early 
bourgeoisie was interested in promoting. This method of invoking and employing the potent 
and volatile drives that Keynes (1935) called ‘animal spirits’ – drives that never learn from 
their consequential errors – is acknowledged with few misgivings in economic literature 
across the political spectrum from Adam Smith to the present day (see also Akerloff and 
Shiller, 2009). 
 
European and American liberal-capitalist discourse has always displayed a fear of naturalism, 
the collapse of the autonomous individual’s ability to withstand natural drives and forces 
(Dews, 2008). However, what this prevailing discourse neglects is that, with the constant 
accent on novelty, sensation and positive freedom, consumer culture systematically taps into 
drives to stimulate desires, which constantly propels the individual too close to the obscene 
Real, the psyche’s natural core of conflicting and unnameable drives, the primal source of 
objectless anxiety (Hall et al., 2008; Hall, 2012b). Liberal-capitalist discourse facilitates the 
process negatively by deflecting critique away from consumer culture and its constantly 
expanding space for desire in the system of symbolic objects (Baudrillard, 2005), a space in 
which unleashed drives can spill out to be captured and transformed as yearnings for various 
commodities. When liberal-capitalism replaced various cultures based on collective 
orientation to the Good with a system of minimal rights (Badiou, 2002), drives were no 
longer directed by cultivated desires towards the transcendental Ideal, but unleashed to be 
harnessed by the economy. Any overspill acted out as violent or acquisitive crime is simply 
dissipated in a brief ritual of moral outrage and fielded on the boundary by bureaucratic 
institutions, which punish or try to reform or rehabilitate the individual rule-breaker. Thus, 
although liberal-capitalism has been moderately successful in its attempts to transcend the 
‘big evils’ that can be committed in the service of the transcendental Ideal, because it refuses 
to engage intellectually or politically with drive, desire and consumer culture’s techniques of 
stimulation and capture it remains trapped in the tension between the constant effervescence 
of atomised ‘little evils’ and the constant recourse to the potential ‘big evil’ of repressive, 
authoritarian governance (Hall, 2012a).  
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What is the psychosocial source of what we have in times past called ‘evil’? For many 
psychoanalysts it is associated with social interaction during early stages of the life-course: 
 
Psychoanalysts, even from widely differing traditions, have concurred that evil is best 
understood as the attempt to inflict one’s own experience of the evacuation of 
meaning on others. In his study of serial killers, for example, Christopher Bollas 
[1995] has suggested that such individuals seek to induce in others their own early 
experience of a total, traumatic breakdown of trust in the benignity of the adult world. 
(Dews, 2008: 133; see also Winlow, this volume) 
 
This formulation casts doubt on Wieviorka’s (2012) claim that evil tends to be invoked to 
restore meaning and control. In extreme cases trauma prevents initial formative experiences 
of meaning and control and is thus unable to be accepted, symbolised or explained by the 
child; meaning and control are never established in the first place. Such fundamental terror 
invokes recourse to drive, the impulse to act out without first delaying and considering the 
broader causes and potential consequences through ethical and rational-communicative 
filters. However, acting out the stimulated impulse to defend the self is impossible in such an 
imbalanced power relation.  Constant exposure to traumatic abuse with no effective means of 
defence or escape represses and embodies the impulse to act in the neurological system as a 
latent but volatile force in the individual’s plastic, adaptable pre-symbolic system of affects 
and emotions, which comes to the fore when exposed to symbolic actions that represent and 
thus trigger the memory of trauma (Winlow and Hall, 2009). Associated with the unleashing 
of the impulse is a primal embodied ethic, one of justifiable revenge sought to redress the 
original trauma and defend the self from a world populated by untrustworthy, violent others 
(Winlow, this volume). 
 
However, if the subject’s drive to act out extreme revenge risks being compromised by even 
the slightest inkling that the selected victim is not in reality the source of the original trauma, 
the subject enters another dimension beyond ethical justification. For Sullivan (1953), where 
the ‘good me’ is a product of love, warmth and nurturing and the ‘bad me’ is a product of 
anxiety, the psychopathic ‘not me’ – the dissociated self – is a product of its own ethically 
and intellectually unrestrained acting out of the initially repressed impulse to violence in the 
face of symbols of extreme threat, and the subsequent denial of the action and the impulse 
behind it in order to protect the self from both its own residual moral judgement and the 
further threat of social retribution. The ‘not me’ is born of absolute denial. Indeed, the 
threatening other can be constructed ideologically to induce fear for political purposes – the 
central thesis behind the standard ‘fear of crime’ discourse – but this can provide only a 
secondary aetiological analysis because the primary cause and the mechanism of denial are 
already established in the affective-emotional system of the subject, before violent actions 
can be justified and excused in socio-cultural systems of knowledge and communication. The 
denial of the violence of the self and its perceived identity-group is a product of the symbolic 
reproduction of the conditions in which trauma was experienced and the subject created itself 
in its fundamental fantasy (see Žižek, 2006) of the victim seeking revenge on the force that 
destroyed the original ‘lost object’ of love, trust and security, a force that can be represented 
by a broad spectrum of ideological symbols. 
 
We cannot simply extend this explanation of the source of violence in extreme individual 
trauma to the study of violence in its broad and complex social context. Although there is 
little doubt that liberal-capitalism, like other unequal yet enduringly successful 
socioeconomic systems, was founded on traumatising episodes of violence in its founding 
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phases and punctuated by similar episodes in periods of crisis (Lusordo, 2011), it certainly 
does not want public life to be overrun by hordes of psychopathic serial killers. However, 
what the liberal-capitalist socioeconomic project does require, as we have seen, is a 
hegemonic culture of measured aggression to fuel the dynamic force of social competition in 
the economy. As well as eager consumers, the system’s logic also requires leading subjects to 
act as role-models and ‘movers and shakers’ at the cutting edge of its unforgivingly 
competitive economy, occasionally ruthless ‘undertakers’ who are willing to risk harm to 
others in order to ‘get things done’ in their functional business lives in a sublimated, rule-
bound mode of action that constantly pushes against ethical boundaries (see Hall, 2012a).  
 
The question we must ask in future theory and research is whether an attenuated, modified 
variant of the potentially violent dissociated self has throughout the capitalist-modernist era 
been cultivated as a an everyday form of subjectivity that combines the ability to exist as a 
normal law-abiding citizen yet retain and act out ruthlessly aggressive impulses in non-
violent modes in the interconnected realms of consumerism, business and politics. As we 
have already seen in the legally-induced disruption of the family unit and the casting out of 
the individual into a competitive outland, ‘breakdown of trust’ was a traumatic formative 
event in the formation of English bourgeois culture. This is of course trauma of a far more 
subtle and variable type, but over the course of the capitalist project it has nonetheless been 
sustained and systematically applied to working individuals who, because they have rarely 
achieved a high degree of political solidarity, have only the flimsiest means of defence. In 
today’s post-political climate (see Mouffe, 2000) the fundamental breakdown of trust in the 
benignity of the world has been diffused outwards from the micro-relations of the family to 
be reflected in broad social attitudes, which, over recent decades, seem to be harshening, not 
just towards the global business class and the bureaucratised and supine political class, but, 
more crucially, in the absence of political solidarity, towards fellow citizens (Winlow and 
Hall, 2013). As the majority lose sight of alternative visions of the future and become 
increasingly affected by negative feelings of cynicism and nihilism, anxiety is intensified and 
drives are re-activated. The atomised individual must compete in some way or face crushing 
failure in life, but in doing so risks a movement too close to the obscene Real, a possible 
descent into the natural uncontrolled drives that to liberal discourse is the one true evil that 
still exists in a latent form, currently restrained by relocated ethics acting as ‘strategic 
normative practices’ backed up on the boundary by a repressive external system of control. 
 
 
Concluding remarks 
Liberal-capitalism was an experiment with the length of the libidinal leash, to see how far it 
could be released and in what ways drives could be stimulated, sublimated, restrained and 
disciplined before they became socially toxic. The culture that accompanied this epoch 
cannot be seen as a ‘civilizing process’ or a ‘disciplinary society’, except insofar as it acted as 
a restraining mechanism on pre-existing drives that have been systematically stimulated for 
specific political and economic purposes. Rather, the simultaneous functional stimulation and 
control of libidinal drives constitutes a pseudo-pacification process. This process generates 
immense undialectical tension between stimulated obscene drives and a complex system of 
desire-formation, repression, sublimation and economic utilisation. This is not simply desire 
manipulated to serve control, as Marcuse (1991) suggested; desire is genuinely free to seek 
its objects, but the media-marketing system monopolises the communicative space in which 
objects are socially valued and sought. Control – unwieldy, expensive and anathema to 
neoliberalism’s core ethos of cost-cutting and downsizing public institutions – is the reluctant 
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means, not the end, in a process that serves stimulation, pacification, economic growth and 
profitability. 
 
In a process that constantly and systematically stimulates a pervasive sense of loss and 
trauma, the meaning and control that Wieviorka (2012) claims the subject seeks to ‘restore’ 
has never been fully experienced. Social peace became dependent on the constant expansion 
of the arena in which the majority can compete over economic opportunities and 
sociosymbolic status by pseudo-pacified means. We all need to consume, but deep 
incorporation into consumerism’s culture of jouissance distracts the mass of working-class 
individuals from fully committed involvement in the politics of solidarity (Winlow and Hall 
2012; 2013). If ‘evil’ is the product of the breakdown of solidarity and trust and the 
subsequent activation of the malignant will in an unmediated connection to death drive, 
which seeks its enjoyment in the destruction of all meaning and morality and the infliction of 
its painful experience of this on the other, it is not difficult to understand how this force can 
be invoked and repressed in an attenuated form that is quite easily sublimated by the 
indiscriminately competitive sociosymbolic world of consumer culture and harnessed to 
capitalist production. However, first it must be stimulated as drive, and this is the danger. 
People are not immutably ‘evil’, but our culture rests on a bedrock of over-stimulated drives 
that can cut through systems of ethico-rational mediation and external control to fuel anti-
social and violent actions when the promise of an endless supply of opportunities for 
economic prosperity and sociosymbolic ascendance is threatened.  
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